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Purpose 
This research contributes to current debates on automation and the future of work, a much-hyped 
but under researched area, in emerging economies through a particular focus on India. It assesses 
the national strategy on Artificial Intelligence and explores the impact of automation on the Indian 
labour market, work and employment to inform policy. 
Methodology 
The article critically assesses the National Strategy on AI, promulgated by NITI Aayog (a national 
policy think tank), supported by the government of India and top industry associations, through a 
sectoral analysis. The key dimensions of the national strategy are examined against scholarship on 
the political economy of work in India to better understand the possible impact of automation on 
work. 
Findings 
The study shows that technology is not free from the wider dynamics that surround the world of 
work. The adoption of new technologies is likely to occur in niches in the manufacturing and services 
sectors, while its impact on employment and the labour market more broadly, and in addressing 
societal inequalities will be limited. The national strategy, however, does not take into account the 
nature of capital accumulation and structural inequalities that stem from a large informal economy 
and surplus labour context with limited upskilling opportunities. This raises doubts about the 
effectiveness of the current policy.  
Research Implications 
The critical assessment of new technologies and work has two implications: first, it underscores the 
need for situated analyses of social and material relations of work in formulating and assessing 
strategies and policies; second, it highlights the necessity of qualitative workplace studies that 




The article assesses an influential state policy in a key aspect of future of work - automation.  
Social implications 
The policy assessed in this study would have significant social and economic outcomes for labour, 
work and employment in India. The study highlights the limitations of the state policy in addressing 
key labour market dimensions and work and employment relations in its formulation and 
implementation. 
Originality and Value 
This study is the first to examine the impact of automation on work and employment in India. It 
provides a critical intervention in current debates on future of work from the point of view of an 
important emerging economy defined by labour surplus and a large informal economy.  
 
Introduction 
The transformational effects of emerging new technologies, such as automation and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), are key points of discussion in debates on the future of work. Optimistic narratives 
about the potential for progress and prosperity from the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) (Schwab, 
2015) are counterpointed by gloomy predictions of a bleak future, where robots and automated 
processes lead to mass casualization, surveillance and control (Graham et al., 2017; Fuchs, 2016; 
Ford, 2015). These extreme positions are, however, both tempered by academic scholarship, which 
emphasises that these technologies are most likely to impact on the nature and quality of work, 
rather than replacing it (Thompson and Briken, 2017). Automation is not a new phenomenon, and 
fears about technological transformation of the workplace and its effects on employment date back 
a long time (Braverman, 1974). Research on the scope of the impact of new technologies is still 
emerging, and is even rarer in emerging and developing economies (Lima et al., 2021 for Brazil).  
It is important to situate global narratives in the specific contexts of developing and emerging 
economies, because the impact of technology on the future of work will be shaped by a complex 
interplay of social and material relations. In labour-abundant economies such as India, the effects of 
emerging technologies could potentially be dramatic and pose a challenge for development 
paradigms. India has for a long time struggled with structural inequalities and poverty, a 
predominance of informal work and self-employment, processes decentring work from the 
workplace, a withdrawal of the state from social provisioning, and challenges for workers’ collective 
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organisation. At the same time, India has niche expertise in Information Technology, and young 
graduates and mid-level professionals appear likely to benefit from the AI revolution (NITI Aayog, 
2018). Tensions over inequality – aggravated by fears that technological innovations will undermine 
job opportunities and security – dominate the discourse. An assessment of the potential of new 
technologies, extent of their adoption and impact can provide critical insights into the future of work 
in India, and other similar economies, and thus assist in devising effective policy interventions.  
This article contributes to current debates by an assessment of the impact of automation and AI on 
work and employment in India, probing the role of policy. Given that research on this subject in the 
Indian context is scant, it critically assesses the National Strategy on AI articulated in the NITI Aayog 
report, which is supported by the Government of India and by top industry organisations, NASSCOM 
and FICCI, through a sectoral analysis. This strategy is examined against scholarship on the political 
economy of work in India (for example, Hammer, 2019; Barnes, 2018; Raj and Sen, 2016; Breman, 
2010). The key argument is that the National Strategy on AI does not account for the nature of 
capital accumulation and the labour market in India, where a large informal economy is central to 
how work and employment is organised, and skills are developed and deployed. The article argues 
that, for any policy intervention to succeed, it is necessary to acknowledge and address this reality, 
and thereby raises doubts about the effectiveness of the state’s strategy on automation and AI 
through a sectoral analysis of the impact of automation on work. This understanding has far-
reaching implications, because a large portion of the world populace labours in informal and 
precarious work that is insecure, poorly paid and unprotected. Informal labour accounts for 85.8 per 
cent of total employment in Africa, 71.4 per cent in Asia and the Pacific, 68.6 per cent in the Middle 
East and 53.8 per cent in the Americas, for a total of 69.6 per cent in all developing economies. In 
addition, the extension of processes of precarisation across the whole Global North makes the level 
61.2 per cent globally (ILO 2018a). 
The article is structured as follows. The next section reviews key debates on automation, AI and 4IR, 
and situates India in the debate. Section three outlines and assesses main aspects of the national 
strategy on automation and AI and its impact on work in key sectors. Conclusions are drawn in the 
final section. 
Automation, AI and Work: Context and Debates 
In global narratives of the future of work, the technological shift referred to as the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution (Schwab, 2015) is supposedly leading to a dramatic rise in industrial as well as service-
sector automation, which is changing labour markets and sometimes replacing skilled labour. 
Accelerating innovation and new technologies are creating new occupations, new industries, and 
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new ways of working. The scope, velocity, and systemic impact of these recent developments have 
given rise to widespread fears about the future of work and employment, leading to the elimination 
of jobs and the disappearance of many current occupations (Hirschi, 2017; Ford, 2015). Some argue 
for the need to devise new mechanisms to either slow down the effects of automation or 
compensate for lost income in the form of Basic Income programmes (Davala et al., 2015; Standing, 
2017). 
Despite the hype around developments in technology, the evidence suggests that the spread of 
emerging technology is less significant than often assumed, and, in terms of the generation of profit, 
has so far had only a marginal effect (World Development Report, 2019). The widely popularised 
report by Frey and Osborne (2017), which estimated that about 50 per cent of total US employment 
is at risk of being automated, was criticised on similar grounds. The fear of large-scale loss of jobs to 
technology was argued to be unfounded, since jobs consist of many tasks, among which several 
might not be easily automatable, in particular non-repetitive and unstructured tasks; automation is 
unlikely to eliminate entire occupations (Autor, 2015). In reality, platform companies bring some 
elements of a new business model and new ways of organising work, and as such present challenges 
for policy makers. Platforms do not, however, represent a fundamental change from familiar 
patterns of corporate activity within a capitalist economy (Forde et al., 2017).  
Scholarship, such as labour process analyses, has shown that automation and digitisation do not lead 
to the disappearance of work (Braverman, 1974; Briken et al., 2017). Technological change and 
adaptation of it seldom follows a linear path, and often suffers significant time-lags between 
development and mass adoption, as exemplified by solar energy, the internet and algorithmic 
computing in the twentieth century, and electric vehicles and autonomous transport systems in 
more recent times. How technologies develop, the forms they take and their manner of 
implementation are shaped by wider capitalist social relations, including the agency of employers, 
state actors, workers and representative bodies. Just as different forms of capital have different 
imperatives and orientations that alter their relationship with technological development, workers’ 
collective agency also guides its implementation. New technologies of work are enmeshed in 
managerial systems and are shaped by different, often conflicting, necessities. This results in 
variations in outcomes at the workplace, as suggested by research. For example, Schorpf et al. 
(2017) describe new forms of control and dissent in crowdsourcing platforms, and Movitz and Alvin 
(2017) argue that individualised employment relationships create intragroup and intergroup 
conflicts with limited scope for collectivisation. However, others suggest that new technology and 
digitisation could empower workers and create a new sphere of action, while acknowledging a 
general reduction in autonomy and increased control over workers (Boes et al., 2017). 
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The findings on the scope and disruptive potential of new technologies for work and employment 
remain mixed and disputed, with limited research. Nevertheless, a visible outcome of technological 
progress in the US and European labour markets in recent decades has been the increasing 
polarisation of the labour market (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos et al., 2009). In particular, the 
demand for highly skilled workers has increased, while the demand for workers with less education 
and lower skills has declined. Because the range of tasks that can be automated is expanding rapidly, 
job polarisation is expected to also continue in higher-skilled jobs and tasks (Autor, 2015; see Lima et 
al., 2021 for Brazil). Not surprisingly, the pressure to increase skills through lifelong learning and 
continued education has grown.  
Another major trend has been considerable employment creation in the gig economy, which 
includes crowd-work and work-on-demand via apps, even though their relative numbers remain 
small (De Stefano, 2016; Forde et al., 2017). In India, around 1.3 million migrant workers joined the 
gig economy in 2018, 60 per cent more than in the previous six-month period (TeamLease Services, 
2018). For context, in the last decade approximately 4.75 million people joined the labour force 
annually in India. What is significant is that an estimated 56 per cent of the new employment 
generated by the gig economy is in companies that remain mostly unregulated, where job security 
and benefits are minimal. Food delivery apps Zomato and Swiggy, and cab aggregators Uber and Ola 
lead this industry. McKinsey Global Institute (2016) found that gig-activities were still predominantly 
offered through traditional supply channels as opposed to e-platforms; only 15 per cent of all 
independent workers surveyed reported using a digital platform for their work. 
Implications for Development Models and Equality 
Despite the likely benefits of technology, several key challenges lie ahead, such as those relating to 
its potential to exacerbate inequality and to disrupt labour markets. Among the salient 
considerations in the discussion on the future of work, some are of greater relevant in the context of 
emerging economies like India, such as the role emerging technologies will play in the development 
models, the reshaping of skills by technological and development changes, and the implications of 
these trends for social equity. 
First, technology is blurring the traditional boundaries between the firm and labour, as is evident in 
platform marketplaces, with ambiguous results. Using digital technologies, entrepreneurs are 
creating global platform-based businesses that differ from the traditional input–output production 
processes. This is relevant for developing countries aiming to leapfrog some points along the 
development spectrum, since digital platforms can help even traditional companies to scale-up 
faster and at much lower cost. On the other hand, the rapid transmission of news, exposure and 
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opportunities heightens the perception of rising inequality and can lead to societal fragmentation, 
especially when there is inequality of opportunity or a mismatch between available jobs and skills. 
Overcoming this mismatch is a complex policy undertaking. 
Second, technology is reshaping the skills needed for work. The demand for less advanced skills that 
can be replaced by technology is declining. At the same time, the demand for advanced cognitive 
skills, socio-behavioural skills, and combinations of skills associated with greater technological 
adaptability is rising. Over 94 per cent of global business leaders in 2020 reported that they expect 
employees to pick up new skills on the job – a sharp uptick from 65 per cent in 2018 (WEF, 2020). 
Already evident in developed countries, this pattern is starting to emerge in some developing 
countries (Lima et al., 2021 for Brazil). In countries where a large proportion of the workforce is 
poorly educated and low skilled, the ability to elevate adequate numbers to the appropriate skill 
levels remains limited, as is seen in the experiences and effectiveness of earlier skilling policies in 
India. More importantly, given that the new tasks are employing fewer people, simply having the 
skills may not suffice. Accelerated investment in upskilling and reskilling of workers is needed to 
keep/move people in technology-augmented jobs of tomorrow, and calls for concerted action by 
governments and by business to develop more inclusive and sustainable economies worldwide 
(WEF, 2021). 
Third, technology can be disruptive, but the biggest concerns for workers are the socio-economic 
inequalities they feel most directly at work: un/underemployment, precarious employment, 
stagnant wages and poor social protection – further exacerbated by COVID-19. Pre-pandemic, 1.4 
billion people worldwide were in “vulnerable forms of employment” in the informal sector, 
compared to 192 million unemployed; and 82 per cent of women in developing countries were in 
vulnerable forms of employment in 2017, compared to 72 per cent of men (ILO, 2018b). Structural 
inequalities of ethnicity, gender, religion, age and mobility reinforce the disadvantages in the labour 
market and at work. In many emerging and developing economies, a large number of workers 
perforce remain in low-productivity jobs, often in informal sector firms whose access to technology 
is poor.  
These concerns around the impact of new technologies on the future of work – such as labour 
displacement, job polarisation, the transformational impact on employment, skills and equity – do 
not function in abstract. Rather, they are mediated through local social and economic relations and, 
therefore, need to be examined in specific societal and geographical contexts. The following section 
of this paper therefore considers the Indian context. 
Situating India: Informality, Jobless Growth and Inequality 
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India displays most, though not all, features of a postcolonial, fast-growing emerging economy with 
some niche high-growth sectors, such as the IT sector and electronics. At the same time, high levels 
of poverty in agriculture, high levels of informality (comprising informal sector and informal 
employment), and industrial development rooted in informalisation, create a low-wage, low-
productivity, medium technology context for Indian capitalism. Social relations of gender, caste, 
ethnicity, and religion intersect with material relations, further reinforcing existing inequalities in the 
labour market and at the workplace (for a comprehensive review see Hammer, 2019). 
The informal economy dominates, characterised almost universally by informal employment marked 
by subsistence wages and employment and social insecurity. Over 80 per cent of the Indian 
workforce is engaged in the informal sector, and about 92.4 per cent is in informal employment, a 
considerably higher share than the estimated 70 per cent average in other developing countries 
(NCEUS, 2009). Historically, agrarian reforms have failed to address social and economic inequalities, 
and industrial growth and urbanisation have also not translated into major formal employment 
gains. This has increased pressures on agriculture as well as the low-productivity non-agricultural 
informal sector to provide employment. As agriculture has been unable to sustain livelihoods, it 
created a situation of permanent labour surplus, with high levels of informality (largely subsistence 
self-employment/petty commodity production) inhibiting wage growth in the formal sector and 
preventing any escape from poverty and informality (Harriss-White, 2010). Agriculture remains the 
largest employer, with a vast majority (amounting to almost 60 per cent) depending on it directly or 
indirectly. These trends in agriculture and the informal economy were exacerbated after the 
liberalisation of 1991, and starkly after COVID-19, along with high and rising unemployment resulting 
in the recent migrant labour crisis (Hensman, 2020).  
Furthermore, the growth in manufacturing in capital intensive high-technology industries, such as 
automobiles, has not translated into significant employment creation. A growth rate of 7 per cent 
has created less than 1 per cent employment growth, leading to fears of entrenched ‘jobless growth’ 
(Basole et al., 2018). Fewer than two million jobs are being created annually, in a country where the 
working age population grows by approximately 16 million every year. The rate of unemployment 
among youth, and the higher-educated in particular, is nearly twice that of any other category. at 16 
per cent. Moreover, a majority of manufacturing firms are in the informal sector, with low wages, 
low productivity, and limited access to infrastructural support or credit (Raj and Sen, 2016). 
Jobless growth, rising unemployment and declining labour force participation in the manufacturing 
sector are accompanied by rising informalisation of the workforce, with a shift from permanent to 
temporary work, increasing de-unionisation among firms, and the decentralisation of bargaining, 
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resulting in marginalisation of political unionism. The notable increase has been in contractual 
employment and self-employment, and the slowest growth has been in regular formal employment, 
suggesting a deterioration of employment conditions (Breman, 2010; Srivastava, 2015; Kapoor and 
Krishnapriya, 2017).  
The disconnect between growth and employment has accompanied a shift towards service-led 
growth. The services sector contributed 63 per cent of GDP growth over the last decade, but a 
significantly smaller share in employment, at about 33 per cent. Though some niche areas have 
grown (such as the IT and BPO industries, retail and financial services), over 55 per cent of service-
sector employment in India is still made up of petty trade, domestic services and other types of 
small-scale and informal employment, and – more recently – gig-activities by professionals, while 
the social sector services (education, health and public administration) account for 23 per cent of 
employment (Basole et al., 2018). 
This sectoral skewness is compounded by the complex intersection of economic relations by social 
relations of gender, caste, and religion (among others) in the labour market and work and 
employment relations. India has one of the lowest labour participation rates for women, and this 
rate has been declining since 2004–05. Between 2011–2012, 19.6 million women dropped out of the 
workforce, of which 53 per cent were rural women. Participation rates among educated women are 
lower in urban areas, indicating a lack of meaningful work opportunities (Tandem report, 2018). 
Women and other marginalised groups are also more likely to be concentrated in subsistence self-
employment and the lowest rungs of employment, with restricted access to education and skills 
development, health and other public services; low levels of capital ownership; and greater 
discrimination while seeking employment or credit (NCEUS, 2009).  
The education and skilling system reflects and reproduces the inequalities for the majority. 
Education is geared towards higher education, mostly accessible to the elite. Formal education and 
skill structures provided by the state suffer from poor quality, capacity and outcome. The most 
vulnerable segments of the workforce in the informal economy have poor access to institutions of 
training, accompanied by poor information dissemination and take-up – especially by disadvantaged 
groups – of government training initiatives launched in the last decade (NCEUS, 2009). The weakness 
of state provisioning has historically been accompanied by firms’ reluctance to invest in training, 
since they prefer training casual labour on the job in order to keep labour costs low for a given skill 
set and to limit labour turnover (Breman, 2010). Only 17 per cent of firms in India provide in-service 
training, predominantly to formal workers, a minority in the labour force. According to the Periodic 
Labour Force Survey (2017–18), only 1.8 per cent of the population received formal vocational 
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training, 5.6 per cent received informal training, while 93 per cent received no training. A purely 
supply-side approach could never counter the pervasive logic of capital accumulation based on 
informal labour and informal skilling (xxx, 2019). The Skill Certification and Reward Scheme and the 
Skill India Initiative, for youth training and employment, trained over 1.8 million individuals in 2015. 
However, only 12.4 per cent of the trainees were actually placed. On average, only 30 per cent of 
those skilled are highly skilled, and the rest have low or medium levels of skill (Tandem report, 
2018).  
This brief review underscores India’s unique labour market conundrums: high degrees of informal 
work / self-employment, low productivity juxtaposed with the advent of mechanisation in the high-
growth sectors, low female participation in the workforce, and marginalisation of large groups. Job 
creation in the age of increasing automation is going to present severe challenges in a country 
already facing acute problems of high rates of formal unemployment, the ‘skills problem’, and 
poverty wages without any social security or employment protection. An assessment of the future of 
work, thus, needs to focus on: first, the role of surplus labour and of the vast informal economy. In a 
labour-abundant emerging economy like India, the rise of automation-induced-unemployment raises 
the spectre of potentially alarming consequences. Second, the impact of new technologies on 
employment is crucial in the context of a large informal economy, characterised by vast poverty and 
inequalities. Third, the extent and role of skilling and reskilling to meet the changing needs posed by 
automation and AI will be significant. According to NASCCOM, by 2022 around 46 per cent of the 
workforce of India will be engaged in entirely new jobs that do not exist today, or will be deployed in 
jobs that have radically changed skillsets. A recent survey (WEF, 2021) shows that 45 per cent of 
Indian companies accelerated their innovations and investments in AI during the pandemic, mostly 
in automating tasks that replace human labour and reconfigure traditional manufacturing value 
chain practices. However, skills development and deployment, so crucial to the adoption of new 
technologies, remains weak, inaccessible for the majority with limited scope for upskilling. Finally, 
the social impact of these new technologies, especially on the quality of work and societal equality, 
is critical. So far, work has reproduced social inequalities. The next section assesses the National 
Strategy on AI in the context of these concerns. 
National Strategy for Automation and AI and the Political Economy of Work and Employment in 
India  
The national strategy for automation and AI in India, articulated in the Government of India’s 
‘National Strategy on AI’ (NITI Aayog Discussion paper, 2018a, 2018b) and by top business and 
industry organisations, emphasises the high potential of automation and AI, the importance of 
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skilling to reap the benefits from these technologies, and their role in achieving inclusive 
development. This section outlines the key aspects of the strategy and assesses them against the 
political economy of work and employment in various sectors. 
The National Strategy for Automation and AI 
The strategy paper emphasises AI’s economic impact and AI for greater good (social development 
and inclusive growth). Five sectors of the Indian economy are expected to benefit most significantly 
from AI and to achieve the goals of #AIforAll: healthcare, agriculture, education, smart cities and 
infrastructure, and smart mobility and transportation. The paper identifies barriers that need to be 
addressed in order to achieve the goals of #AIforAll: (a) lack of broad-based expertise in research 
and application of AI, (b) absence of enabling data ecosystems – access to intelligent data, (c) high 
resource cost and low awareness for adoption of AI, (d) privacy and security, including a lack of 
formal regulations around anonymisation of data, and (e) absence of collaborative approach to 
adoption and application of AI.  
According to the strategy, the barriers to AI development and deployment can effectively be 
addressed by adopting the marketplace model – one that enables market discovery of not only the 
price but also of different approaches that are best suited to achieve the desired results. A three-
pronged formal marketplace on a common platform called the National AI Marketplace (NAIM) is 
proposed, focusing on data collection, aggregation, annotation and deployable models. In its analysis 
and recommendations, the NITI Aayog paper emphasises the need for incentivising core and applied 
research on AI. It goes on to state that as technology increasingly disrupts the nature of jobs and 
shifts the benchmarks of technological aptitude, the skilling and reskilling of the existing workforce 
will be integral to adopting AI, and for developing future talent in accordance with the changing 
needs of the job market. This is visualised via the adoption of decentralised teaching mechanisms, 
working in collaboration with the private sector and educational institutions to prescribe 
certification with value.  
This approach to AI is supported by key industry organisations. The Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the oldest and largest apex body of business and industry, 
emphasises India’s ongoing digital transformation and its lead in the global digital space. Through its 
focus on “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Transformation” FICCI forecasts that India’s digital 
transformation market will reach $710.0 billion by 2024 due to increasing adoption of emerging 
technologies under Industry 4.0 in the country. It engages its members for the overall growth of ICT 
adoption across sectors, and the major role played by Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
(FICCI website, n.d.). The National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), the 
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top industry association for the IT and BPO industries in India, also reiterates the growing 
significance and impact of AI applications. NASSCOM is of high significance, since these trends 
relating to the future of work are closely associated with the IT and BPO industries. It sees global 
technology shifts as having laid the foundation for cutting edge innovation – with India emerging as 
a hub for innovative and transformational AI solutions and investments (2018 a, 2018b). More 
recent reports highlight that data science and AI could address the dual goals of economic and social 
value creation and recovery, with a potential to add $500 billion to India’s GDP by 2025, support 
inclusive development, and contribute to COVID 19 responses and economic recovery. For 
NASSCOM, to harness the potential of AI requires the right mix of talent and technology to deliver 
value, especially in retail, agriculture, banking and healthcare. It estimates that about 40 per cent of 
the Indian technology workforce must be reskilled in the next 5 years to cope with new 
technologies, and workers may need to switch occupations (2020a, 2020b).  
The national strategy is cognisant of the potential of new technologies and the role of skilling in 
adoption of these technologies. It focuses on job-creating sectors such as agriculture, health, 
education and urban infrastructure. Nevertheless, it suffers from a number of limitations, most 
critically in being technocratic and ignoring the historical and contemporary context of work and 
employment and accumulation processes. There are two glaring omissions. First, the challenges 
posed by the presence of a large informal economy and its centrality to the logic of capitalist 
accumulation in India, especially as the informal economy has long-standing and wide-ranging social 
implications. Second, while the critical role of skills in adopting new technologies is acknowledged, 
the plan of ‘decentralised’ teaching and training is not embedded in the reality of how skills are 
developed and deployed. The question then arises: will the advent of automation and AI break with 
and / or address these challenges in the Indian model of capitalism and work and employment 
relations? This is analysed in the following section with respect to work in key sectors. 
Informality and Precarity in Times of AI and Automation: A Sectoral Analysis 
This section assesses the potential and extent of adoption of new technologies in various sectors, 
and their impact on employment relations and labour market equality, to bring out the complexity 
of new technologies for the future of work. 
Manufacturing: Automation with Contractualisation and Self-employment 
The manufacturing sector has high automation potential, but the adoption of automation needs to 
be assessed alongside the trade-offs involved between the cost of technological upgrading and the 
cost of labour in India, a labour-abundant economy. Labour-intensive manufacturing industries, such 
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as textile, apparel, leather and footwear, and paper manufacturers are unlikely to adopt high 
technologies because of their slow growth and need for high capital investments. In light of these 
factors, a significant barrier is the fact that a majority of these firms are small scale and in the 
informal sector. Even though certain work processes such as spinning are increasingly automated, 
firms are unlikely to transform their production processes because of the high costs associated with 
switching over and the abundant supply of low-cost labour. Capital intensive manufacturing 
industries, such as the high-technology export-oriented automobile and telecommunication 
production, are more likely to adopt advanced automation, partly because of the high number of 
routine tasks required for welding, polishing, and painting. Automation is increasingly used by 
automobile companies, which buy 60 per cent of all industrial robots sold in India, with 550 robots at 
work in the Ford plant, 400 at Hyundai, and another 4200 in the factories of Honda and Suzuki 
(Prakash, 2015). Indigenous firms such as Bharat Forge and other precision auto-component 
manufacturers also have highly automated plants. 
With respect to work and employment, automation in the manufacturing sector is driven by 
contractualisation and labour replacement by firms. The share of contract workers in total 
employment rose from 15.7 per cent in 2000–2001 to 26.47 per cent in 2010–11, while that of 
directly employed workers fell from 61.12 per cent to 51.53 per cent in the same period. More 
significantly, the increase in contract workers has accounted for about 47 per cent of the total 
increase in employment in the organised manufacturing sector over the last decade (Hammer, 
2019). It is fairly common in the industry for apprentices and contract workers to work alongside 
full-time workers to do the same job on the same shop floor, and for supply chains to source 
extensively from the informal economy (Hammer, 2010; Barnes, 2018). Thus, while new jobs may be 
created, increased contractualisation is leading to worsening of employment conditions. Contract 
workers can be easily dismissed, receive a much lower wage than permanent workers, and do not 
have access to social protection mechanisms. Firms also hire contract workers to reduce the 
bargaining power of regular, unionised workers (Srivastava, 2015).  
Along with contractualisation, the other employment trend likely to intensify is a shift from wage 
employment to self-employment. While new opportunities for entrepreneurship may be created, 
evidence shows that, for most, self-employment is not a choice but a necessity. Over 80 per cent of 
the workforce in the informal sector is classified as self-employed, but operate at subsistence level 
with little access to capital or social security. Countering the myth that this shift to self-employment 
represents ‘entrepreneurialism’, the reality is of the ‘hidden dependency’ of self-employment, and 
its gendered and caste- and community-based basis, which is created through an intricate 
mechanism of subcontracting in global production networks. The self-employed are locked into 
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unequal exchange relations with large firms or merchants, and depend on intermediaries for 
equipment and production inputs. The dependency is compounded by piece-rate payment schemes, 
which underpin work intensification and a reliance on self-exploitation and unpaid family labour. 
Though not labelled as formal wage labour, the self-employed are largely precarious, informal 
workers prone to very similar exploitative processes as formal wage workers, or worse (Hammer, 
2019). Thus, a shift to self-employment with increased automation may signify increasing informality 
and precarity, and lower employment conditions for many.  
 Services: Automation with Self-employment 
The impact of emerging technologies is most visible in the BPO and IT industries, the financial sector 
(particularly private sector banks adopting Robotic Process Automation technologies), and in 
customer services (with widespread use of chatbots and internet banking). Routine and back-end 
tasks are increasingly automated. However, this shift is likely to be technology driven and unlikely to 
create widespread employment opportunities, as suggested by a significant slowdown in hiring and 
an increase in redundancies in the IT sector since 2016–17. One report indicates that 640,000 low-
skilled service jobs in the IT sector are at risk to automation, while only 160,000 mid- to high-skilled 
positions will be created in the IT and BPO service sectors (Tandem report, 2018). IT sector workers 
will need to rapidly upskill, but fewer jobs will be created in the medium-long run. Informalisation 
and contractualisation through outsourcing and subcontracting are increasing, at the cost of formal 
employment relationships. There is a growing preference for project-based teams and consultants as 
an alternative to full-time employees (Barnes, 2015). 
The platform economy promises new economic opportunities for service workers, especially women 
and migrant workers, by enabling new forms of micro-entrepreneurship and freelance work. It can 
improve employment conditions in terms of higher income, better working conditions, flexible work 
hours, or access to banking. Platforms also promise a sense of community that can be mobilised for 
collective bargaining. However, leveraging these opportunities requires workers to have technical 
skills, when a majority have medium or low levels of skills and limited opportunity to upskill. The 
economic case for upskilling, particularly as India considers how best to allocate funding for the 
recovery from COVID-induced ravages, also highlights the disconnect between current education 
programmes and the skills that employers need. In terms of conditions of employment, surveillance 
and control belie the rhetoric of freedom, flexibility and autonomy. As argued by Graham et al. 
(2017), sharing labour platforms are unregulated, profit-seeking, data-generating infrastructures 
that rest on opaque labour supply chains and asymmetrical algorithmic operations. Like 
manufacturing, participation in gig-work is driven by the unavailability of alternative secure 
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employment. Most workers work multiple jobs for multiple employers on a piece-rate basis, and lack 
access to formal social protection. Thus, automation is creating a flexible and controlled ‘digital 
labour’ base, reproducing informality and precarious working conditions rather than positively 
transforming work. 
 Agriculture: Limited Automation and Persistent Poverty 
Agriculture remains the largest source of employment in India, and the national strategy rightly 
identifies agriculture as a major focus with a high automation potential. Most tasks can be classified 
as manual and routine, such as planting crops, applying pesticides and fertilisers, and harvesting. 
Applications of AI technology and data analytics also have the potential to improve farm 
productivity, highlighted by the many unicorn agri-tech start-ups in India. However, as in other 
sectors, the government neither makes reference to nor works to counter the underlying dynamics 
of agriculture and its role in creating and perpetuating informal employment.  
Agriculture in India continues to be characterised by structural inequalities, widespread poverty, 
subsistence farming, low-skill levels and low productivity, as mentioned earlier. Ownership of land is 
concentrated amongst a few, with limited capital investment, while 75 per cent of rural workers 
work in the informal sector, and 85 per cent have no employment contract, health and safety or 
social security, some being subject to ‘neo-bondage’ (Breman, 2010; Harriss-White, 2010). In this 
context of high inequality combined with the decreasing size of land-holdings, low growth and low 
capital investment, any widespread adoption of advanced farm automation and digital technologies 
appears unrealistic. More likely is the adoption of micro-technologies and incremental 
mechanisation, rather than the large-scale adoption of advanced technologies. Growing labour 
surplus in agriculture continues to fuel the informal economy, where informal workers cannot break 
the vicious cycle of low wages and low skills, the absence of employment creation and increasing 
informalisation of formal manufacturing and service-sector jobs (in the platform economy and gig-
work) are likely to aggravate these challenges. 
 Skills as Panacea? 
To address the challenges and opportunities of AI and automation, skills have been identified as key 
in the national strategy. Yet, little attention is paid to the underlying social relations of production in 
which the practices of skills development occur, which is crucial for understanding the outcome of 
skills policies and practices (Streeck, 2011; Keep and Mayhew, 2010). Skilling and reskilling, which is 
so central to harnessing and managing the impact of new technologies, does not have a history of 
success in India. Key challenges remaining include poor education and skill structures, exclusion of 
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vulnerable segments of the workforce in the informal economy, and firms’ reluctance to invest in 
training and reliance of informal skilling.  
Public sector investment in skilling initiatives in India is much lower than in developed countries such 
as Germany, which the state has tried to address through private–public-partnerships in the 
Industrial Training Institutes and industry-led vocational training programmes. Under its Skill India 
Mission, the government is engaged with technology firms and NASSCOM to solve job problems, to 
help close the skills gaps as in-demand skills across jobs change in the near term. NASSCOM’s ‘Future 
Skills’ platform, which seeks initially to upskill 4 million IT employees and prospective job seekers in 
eight Indian states, is so far the only skilling ecosystem in India to be backed together by the IT 
industry, NASSCOM and the Indian government. It is aimed at driving a national skilling ecosystem 
for the emergent digital technologies. 
There is a significant digital gender divide in terms of access to mobile technologies and the internet 
that adversely impacts skilling initiatives. In 2017, less than 30 per cent of India’s Internet users were 
women. Women are also 23 per cent less likely than mento own a mobile phone, and only 14 per 
cent of women in rural India own a mobile phone (Tandem report, 2018). Women’s access to digital 
technologies is likely to increase as the affordability and penetration of internet services and devices 
increases. However, low levels of literacy, education, and skilling, reinforced by societal norms, are 
likely to restrict the capacity of women as well as other socially disadvantaged groups to leverage 
new technologies.  
Access to education and skilling is difficult and does not translate into employment opportunities. In 
this context, with the exception of a few highly skilled workers in the automotive and IT sectors, the 
inability of a majority of workers to access skills development initiatives and the lack of recognition 
of informally gained skills are likely to be persistent challenges to the up/reskilling that is so essential 
for the adoption of high technologies. It is difficult to see how this trend could be reversed, or why 
automated, digital firms will adapt to the change. 
To answer the question posed earlier, existing evidence does not support a dramatic shift from the 
existing model of capitalism or a transformational impact of automation for workers; nor is it 
immediately conducive to embark on mass skilling drives. More likely is that the adoption of 
emerging technologies will be uneven and patchy. It may improve employment conditions for some 
individual workers, but will not alter employment conditions for the majority. There is largely a lack 
of public policy interventions needed to ensure that the emergent technologies are used responsibly 
to augment rather than replace labour, creating adverse distributional effects. What this means for 
the development models and social outcomes is discussed next. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
The critical assessment of automation and the future of work in India reveals that the national 
strategy of AI is not contextualised in the political economy of work, employment and skills 
development. In a mass informal economy context such as that of India, which has for long struggled 
to achieve broad-based performance (instead of the isolated pockets of excellence by which it has 
largely been characterised), the state strategy in its present form does not account for the deep-
rooted and enduring employment and skilling problems in India.  
The sectoral assessment suggests that the adoption of high technologies will be in niche organised 
manufacturing and service sectors because of the relatively low cost of labour and infrastructural 
constraints. Capital intensive industries such as automobiles, and financial, legal and IT services have 
high automation potential. However, the overall impact on employment will be limited and skewed, 
as the majority of workers are employed in agriculture and the informal economy. In relation to 
employment, some opportunities will be created, but the spread of new technologies is likely to 
reproduce informal and precarious work rather than transform existing trends. Self-employment is 
likely to increase, but not necessarily accompanied by an improvement in employment conditions. 
The societal implications of this uneven impact of automation on work are far reaching. Current 
trends suggest that technology-led disruptions to the future of work are likely to continue to exclude 
the vast majority of poor and predominantly low-skill workers, and to entrench labour market 
inequalities. The low cost of labour in the informal economy reduces the likelihood of technological 
adoption. A high incidence of poverty combined with low levels of education among semi-urban and 
rural men and women and marginalised social groups will limit their access to potential gains from 
technological development and restrict economic opportunities. Women and marginalised groups 
are even less likely to have the digital fluency skills and are more likely to occupy the low–medium 
skill level jobs that are most vulnerable to the effects of automation. In the IT and BPO sectors, for 
example, women tend to occupy low-skill, back-end jobs, which are likely to be automated first in 
terms of technical feasibility. Platforms do not yet provide access to social protections, thereby 
reproducing precarity. New technologies will also reinforce the vast urban–rural divide.  
This is not to say that innovative opportunities for circumventing these barriers cannot be created 
through the adoption of new technologies – from the growth of the platform economy to remote 
learning opportunities – but their effectiveness will depend on how well they are integrated with 
broader policy interventions. The state has a significant role in shaping the conditions of work and in 
mediating capital and labour relations. It facilitates and perpetuates informal and precarious work 
through regulatory intervention (or lack of it) on the one hand, and provides poor and under-
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sourced skilling structures on the other. Both have critical implications for technological adoption 
and power relations at the workplace. At the same time, addressing both informal work and skills 
development is central to meeting the challenges posed by AI and automation. Automation and AI 
have the potential to address the complex challenges that India is facing across its demographic 
diversity, and in empowering the existing workforce. The state is central to this.  
To conclude, the examination of the relationship between technology and the future of work in India 
shows that technology is not free from the wider dynamics operative in the world of work and is 
shaped by multiple forces. This suggests going beyond the current focus on the transformative or 
disruptive capacities of these technologies to a more balanced scholarship rooted in the reality of 
work (Thompson and Briken, 2017; Forde et al., 2017). This article is a first step in setting the context 
for much needed qualitative workplace studies that pay attention to how existing modes of 
production and social relations are being shaped by new technologies. Such studies will also help 
inform policymaking and skill development strategies in similar economies. 
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